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Introduction
Understanding what makes government responsive to citizens' needs is a key issue in political economy. It is particularly poignant in low-income countries where, in the absence of market opportunities, vulnerable populations rely in large measure on state action for their survival. A key issue is what institutions -economic, social and political -can be built to enhance the effectiveness of the state in social protection.
This paper lays out a framework for thinking about the issues and explores its empirical implications in an Indian context. Among other things, the approach highlights the importance of information ßows about policy actions in increasing government responsiveness, particularly the role of mass media in creating an incentive for governments to respond to citizens' needs.
There are many reasons why the poor and vulnerable may not obtain the full attention of politicians even in a democracy where they have numerical strength. These groups are typically poorly informed and are generally less inclined to vote than richer and better educated citizens. A key question then is what institutions and mechanisms enable vulnerable citizens to have their preferences represented in policy. It is important that they have enough electoral power to "swing" outcomes if politicians are to be responsive to their demands. This is more likely to be true when electoral turnout is high and political competition is intense. 1 Mass media can play a key role by enabling vulnerable citizens to monitor the actions of incumbents and to use this information in their voting decisions.
We use data from the sixteen major Indian states for the period 1958-1992 to test these ideas. India is an important case study for testing the political economy of responsiveness. It is home to a large vulnerable population which is regularly buffeted by natural shocks including droughts, ßoods, earthquakes and cyclones. Over time, measures including public food distribution and calamity relief programs have been developed to deal with the vulnerability of the poor population. India is a federal democracy and popularly elected state governments play a key role in relief activities. There is a relatively free and independent press with signiÞcant timeseries and cross-sectional variation.
3 Using these data, we are able to demonstrate a robust link between the development of mass media, political factors and government responsiveness.
The paper contributes to a nascent economics literature on the role of the media in inßuencing government behavior. 4 Strömberg (2000) develops a model where politicians commit ex ante to a vector of transfers. These transfers translate more effectively into votes where media is more active by increasing turnout. This paper focuses on the role of the media in mitigating political agency problems by provid-1 These ideas are central to Key's (1950) seminal analysis of politics in the southern United States. 2 Over the period an average of about half the population fell below the poverty line. 3 A number of authors including Sen [1981 Sen [ , 1984 and Ram [1991] have pointed to the role that newspapers and open elections may play in preventing famines. 4 The idea that a key role of the press is to inform the electorate is central to the political science literature on the role of mass media -see, for example, Brians and Wattenberg (1996) and Mondak (1995) .
ing information to voters.
5 This information is important for ex post evaluation of actions rather than to target ex ante commitments more Þnely. However, the ideas are broadly similar. Strömberg (2001) analyzes the theoretical connection between news Þrms and political outcomes in a model in which political information is endogenously provided by proÞt maximizing media. Besley and Prat (2001) consider the possibility that incumbents will try to bribe the media to maintain their silence. They also endogenize media entry. They identify key determinants of media activity as the degree of commercialization, transactions costs between government and media and rents to holding political office.
Empirical work on the importance of the media is also developing. Brunetti and Weder (1999) and Ahrend (2000) Þnd that press freedom is associated with lower levels of corruption in cross-country data. Djankov et al. (2001) focuses more directly on the effect of media ownership patterns on a variety of outcomes. They develop a remarkable data set on media ownership patters in 97 countries to do so. Their main Þnding is that state ownership of the media is, on the whole, negatively correlated with good government. Besley and Prat (2001) use their data to look at the impact of media ownership on political turnover, Þnding that societies with more press freedom (and private media ownership) tend to have shorter tenure by politicians. They also Þnd that foreign ownership of the media is an important variable. Strömberg (2000) relates New Deal spending in county level data for the United States to radio ownership, Þnding a positive association between the two which is consistent with his model of distributive politics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section lays out a theoretical structure as a vehicle for interpreting the results. Section three describes the institutional context for the empirical test and describes the data that we employ. Section four describes the methodology we employ to test the main ideas behind the model and presents the results. Section Þve concludes.
The Model
We use the simplest model possible to isolate the factors that affect the responsiveness of incumbent politicians. The main role of the theory is to motivate the empirical speciÞcation that we use and to generate a number of testable implications. 6 Consider a two period model in which at the beginning of period one, an incumbent has been voted into office. Citizens are of two kinds: vulnerable and non-vulnerable -the former comprising a fraction γ < 1/2 of the population. In period one, a fraction β of the vulnerable population experiences a shock which can be mitigated by public action -we refer to this group as needy. The politician can put in effort (e ∈ [0, E]) , measured in units of (dis)utility, to help the needy.
Incumbents can be one of three types. Altruistic incumbents (type a) always put in the maximal effort level E; selÞsh incumbents (type s) never put in effort, i.e., set e = 0; and opportunistic incumbents (type o) put in effort if it enhances their re-election chances. The probabilities that each type of incumbent is selected ex ante are {µ a , µ s , µ o } respectively. To capture the value of re-election, let Ω be the utility from holding office. Incumbents' effort is not directly observable to vulnerable citizens. However, whether non-zero effort has been put in can be learned from one of two sources. Vulnerable citizens who are not needy in the current period can learn from the media. The extent of media activity is indexed by m. Let q (e, m) be the fraction of such citizens who are informed where q (0, m) = 0, q m (e, m) > 0, q e (e, m) > 0, q em (e, m) > 0 and q ee (e, m) < 0. Thus, information about effort is more likely to be learned when the incumbent has put in more effort. Greater media activity is assumed to increase the marginal impact of effort on the fraction that is informed. The learning technology for the needy citizens, p (e, m) is different -they may observe positive effort directly as well as from the media. Thus, p (e, m) > q (e, m). We assume that p (0, m) = 0, p m (e, m) > 0, p e (e, m) > 0, p em (e, m) > 0 and p ee (e, m) < 0.
After information about effort is realized, there is an election in which a randomly selected challenger is faced by the incumbent. In the second term a random fraction of the vulnerable citizens may again turn out to be needy. Since the opportunistic incumbents have no further re-election concerns, only the altruistic incumbents will put in effort in period two. For this reason the vulnerable citizens will prefer to vote for an incumbent who has been shown to have put in effort in period one, since such an incumbent is deÞnitely not selÞsh.
7
The fraction of the vulnerable population who have learned that their incumbent has put in effort in period one is s (e, m, β) = p (e, m) β + (1 − β) q (e, m) .
All of these citizens vote for the incumbent. 8 We assume that uninformed vulnerable citizens do not vote.
9
All non-vulnerable citizens vote for the incumbent or the challenger for ideological reasons. However, due to natural turnover in the electorate and evolving politics on other issues, the fraction that will vote for the challenger on such grounds is stochastic. Let v be the fraction of voters who end up voting for the incumbent on ideological grounds. We assume that this is distributed uniformly on interval [a, 2b − a] where 1 > b > a ≥ 2b − 1. The parameter b is the expected level of support for the incumbent and a is the guaranteed level of support.
The incumbent wins the election if
7 Using Bayes rule, the probability that the incumbent is altruistic given that a positive effort level has been observed and that opportunistic incumbents are putting in effort is µ a µ a +µ o > µ a . 8 We have not speciÞed the preferences of the vulnerable citizens precisely. However, this would follow from rational behaviour under very weak conditions -essentially there is some value to incumbent effort and that there is a positive probability of being needy in period two. 9 Our results would still go through if we assumed that uninformed vulnerable citizens voted randomly.
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where σ is the turnout rate among vulnerable voters in the election. 10 For a given b, the probability that the incumbent wins if he commits effort e is easily computed to be:
(1) If b = 1/2 and a = 0, then P (e; m, t, β, a, b, σ) ∈ (0, 1) for sure. Low levels of political competition as represented by a value of a or b close to one will result in a situation where the incumbent either wins or loses for sure.
An opportunistic incumbent chooses his effort level to solve:
Looking at this key equation, it is clear that it is similar to the reduced form support maximizing model of Peltzman (1976) . However, the micro-foundations that we have given it will enable us to determine which factors drive the incumbent effort decision. The Þrst order condition for the optimal effort level, denoted e * , (assuming an interior solution) is:
Putting this together, we have the following result which summarizes the prediction of the model:
Proposition: Effort by an opportunistic incumbent is higher if (a) voters have greater media access (high m); (b) there is higher turnout in elections (high σ); (c) there is a larger vulnerable population (high γ); (d) political competition is more intense (low b). A larger needy population raises incumbent effort if p e (e, m) > q e (e, m).
Proof: Using (1) in (2) and deriving the Þrst order condition yields (3). To derive the comparative statics, deÞne
and recall that
The result now follows routinely by differentiating the function h (.) after recalling that q em > 0 and p em > 0. QED This result relies on an interior solution. If b is small enough relative to a, then the incumbent will lose for sure and if a is large enough, then he will win for sure. Thus, the existence of an interior solution for effort for an opportunistic politician hinges on there being a sufficient political competition, i.e. not too great an advantage or disadvantage for the incumbent. Thus apart from the effect of b on equilibrium actions as described in the Proposition, the right amount of political competition is a precondition for any kind of responsiveness by opportunists. It is these predictions of the model that we will bring to the data as it gives a mapping from institutional features into incumbent effort. Intuitively, the reasons for the results are clear. Greater media activity raises the marginal value of effort because it is more likely that the reports of such effort will Þnd their way to voters. Greater turnout increases the effectiveness of effort by turning it into support at the ballot box. The same is true when the vulnerable population is larger. More intensive political competition will also increase the incentives to put in effort. Finally, if it is more likely that effort will be observed by the population who actually experience the shock, then a larger shock will increase effort incentives. Though not strictly predicted by the theory it will also be interesting to examine whether governments are more responsive nearer election times.
11 This would follow if there were a higher political payoff to being responsive nearer elections.
The theory takes media effectiveness as exogenous to the political process. Besley and Prat (2001) develop a model which makes the presence and effectiveness of the media endogenous. Among other things, the transactions costs between the media and the government determine how freely the media operates. Following Djankov et al (2001) , they suggest that media ownership may be a way to proxy for these transactions costs. For example, state owned media can be silenced more easily than privately owned media. Following this general line of argument, we will suggest below an approach to treating access to media as endogenous.
Background and Data
We test the model by looking at determinants of the public distribution of food and state government expenditures on calamity relief. Both the public food distribution and calamity relief systems in India were set up in part to deal with the threat posed by famine and other natural calamities. 12 The public food distribution system now involves large-scale government involvement in the procurement, storage, 11 The model also predicts that an incumbent should be less responsive were he not subject to re-election incentives. While there are no term limits in India to test this with, it is interesting to note that Besley and Case (1995) Þnd that US states where the governor faces a binding term limit are less responsive to natural disasters -a Þnding which is consistent with the theory presented here. 12 For a large part of its history the state in India had limited success in dealing with natural disasters, leading to the death of millions (see Sen, 1981; Dreze 1991; Dreze and Sen, 1989) . transportation and distribution of food grains and provides state governments with the ability to respond to both chronic and temporary food insecurity (Radhakrishna and Subbarao, 1997) . Calamity relief expenditures by state governments covers a range of direct relief measures including drinking water supply, medicine and health, clothing and food, housing, veterinary care and assistance for repair and restoration of damaged property (Government of India, 1990) .
The codes that govern public distribution of food and calamity relief in India stem from the Famine Relief Codes put in place after 1880. 13 They emphasize the need for local administrators to look for signs, such as large drops in food production and increases in food prices, which signal an impending crisis. The aim is to respond by increasing the public distribution of food and through the setting up of public works programs and relief centres to prevent hardship. Before Independence in 1947, it is clear that the existence of these guidelines did not guarantee their early and energetic implementation.
14 Following Independence in 1947, the introduction of representative democracy and the rise of mass media, it is argued, has helped to strengthen accountability and ensure effective implementation of public food distribution and calamity relief programs (see Sen, 1984; Dreze and Sen, 1989) . 15 Elected state governments assumed responsibility for relief operations and there was large increase in regional papers published in languages other than English or Hindi which are more likely to report on government responses to local shocks (see Jeffrey, 2000) . Readership of regional newspapers will also tend to comprise local vulnerable populations who rely on action by state governments for protection.
The newspaper industry that developed was distinguished from the bulk of other low income countries by being relatively free and independent. 16 The press in India has been ascribed a major role in monitoring the actions of politicians and in ensuring their responsiveness to droughts and ßoods which occur at frequent intervals. 17 Using panel data from 1958-1992 we are able to provide a robust test of whether mass media and political institutions play a role in ensuring that state governments are responsive to the social protection needs of their citizens. 13 Frequent and severe famines during both the 18th and 19th centuries were a major source of concern to the British Administration which came to power in 1858. This led to the setting up of Famine Commissions, most notably that of 1880, which produced a set of Famine Codes -detailed guidelines for local administrators about the anticipation, recognition and relief of famines and other natural calamities.
14 There were major famines in 1896-1897, 1899-1900 and 1943. 15 The lack of democracy and of freedom of information have been pointed to as reasons behind why China experienced a major famine between 1958 and 1961 with excess mortality Þgures ranging between 16.5 and 29.5 million whereas India has not experienced a major famine in the postIndependence era (see Dreze and Sen, 1989) . 16 For example, Ram (1991, page 188) observes that "the Indian press is widely regarded as the most pluralistic, the least inhibited and the most assertive or independent in all the Third World".Only 2% of newspapers in India are owned by central and state governments. This is in strict contrast to TV and radio which were mainly under state control during the 1958-1992 period. 17 Ram (1991: 186) describes it's role in averting crisis as follows: "Over time, it has tended to bring out the facts in the Þeld with elements of vivid descriptive and human interest detail; and to expose the failure of government authorities to recognize the problem, its causes and early symptoms, and to respond quickly and adequately in terms of crisis prevention, management, and relief." Table 1 gives means and standard deviations of the main variables that we use averaged for the 1958-1992 period and arrayed by state. 18 This illustrates the signiÞcant variation across the states in terms of government responses, indicators of need, newspaper circulation and political outcomes. The Þrst and second columns of Table 1 consider our two measures of government responsiveness to citizens' needs. Public food distribution per capita varies seven fold between Madhya Pradesh (low) and Kerala (high). Calamity relief expenditure also exhibits pronounced variation across states.
The need for government intervention will be proxied by food grain production per capita in a state and real per capita ßood damage to crops. The third and fourth columns of Table 1 show that there is pronounced cross-sectional and timeseries variation in both of these variables. To illustrate this, we have graphed these variables against time (for each state) in Figures 1 and 2 . Below, we show that these measures of need are signiÞcantly related to rainfall variation.
Media development will be proxied by newspaper circulation both in aggregate and broken down by language of circulation. While crude, we believe that it is likely to capture well the ßow of information about policy to citizens. Figure 3 makes clear that the level of newspaper penetration varies markedly across space and time -variation that we exploit in the econometric analysis. Figure 3 illustrates that circulation in Kerala is highest and has grown most quickly during the period. Circulation levels tend to be higher in Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Punjab and West Bengal and lower in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. Table 1 also shows that there is pronounced cross-state variation in newspaper circulation broken down by language of circulation. This combined with time series variation can be used to better identify the impact of circulation on responsiveness.
India is a federal democracy. As is apparent from Table 1 there is also pronounced variation across states in terms of the functioning of state level political systems. Electoral turnout in elections to state level assemblies (Vidhan Sabha) over the period is high (60.9%) indicating that the Indian population has been politically active as a whole. There is, however, considerable variation across states. Orissa for example registered a turnout of 44.9% over the period whereas the corresponding Þgure for Kerala was 77.6%. Political competition has been intense over the period. Congress has been the dominant party over the period though in each and every state there have been numerous switches between Congress and various competitors (see Data Appendix and the Appendix Table) . Over the period minus the absolute difference between proportion of seats occupied by Congress and its main competitor(s) has been largest for Kerala (−0.15) indicating the most intense political competition and smallest for Maharastra (−0.67) denoting the least political competition. Variation along these different dimensions will be exploited to examine how politics affects government responsiveness. 18 Detail on the construction and sources of these variables are contained in a Data Appendix.
4 Empirical Analysis

Method
Our basic method is to run panel data regressions for states i and years t of the following form:
where α i and β t are state and year Þxed effects and z it is a vector of economic, political and media variables that we might expect to affect government responsiveness (g it ).
This speciÞcation allows the right hand side variables z it to enter both as level terms and interacted with variables which capture the need for state intervention (s it ).
In terms of the theory, we think of the variable s it proxying for β -the fraction of the needy population. We will introduce the other variables that Proposition 1 suggests should affect responsiveness as elements of the vector z it .
Our Þrst task is to deÞne policy response systems to test the predictions. We begin by considering how extreme rainfall conditions affect food grain production and ßood damage variables (s it ). This underlines our use of these variables as exogenous shocks to needs for state intervention. We then examine whether these variables (s it ) affect two different measures of government protection (g it ) -public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure.
Proxies of economic development, that might capture the technological capacity of state governments to respond, are then incorporated as elements of z it . The vector z it is then extended to include media and political variables -speciÞcally newspaper circulation, electoral turnout, political competition and the timing of elections. We look at both aggregate newspaper circulation as well as circulation disaggregated by language. In all cases, we consider an array of interactions between the media and political elements of z it and the food production and ßood damage variables (s it ) which capture the need for state intervention. We also consider whether the results on the importance of newspapers hold up when these are instrumented using media ownership data.
In what follows we Þrst present results that concentrate on the level effects, φ, in equation (4) . In the case of public food distribution, these effects represent determinants of efforts by state governments to address chronic food insecurity of households. They may also measure responses to shocks not captured by the food grain production measure. In the case of calamity relief expenditure, they are most likely picking up shocks other than ßoods to which such expenditures are targeted. 19 We refer to these level effects as government activism. While interesting, the connection of general activism to the theory is less direct than for responsiveness which is better captured by the coefficient (γ) on the interaction with the shock (s it )(z it ).
20 These coefficients pick up whether having greater newspaper circulation, higher turnout or more intense political competition makes state governments more responsive to the need for state intervention. Table 2 shows that food grain production and ßood damage are signiÞcantly driven by extreme rainfall conditions controlling for state and year Þxed effects. The latter are measured by two variables -drought and ßood -which are set equal to one if the annual average rainfall is more than two standard deviations below (drought) or above (ßood) the state speciÞc rainfall mean for the period 1958-1992. Column (1) of Table 2 shows that droughts are associated with a signiÞcant fall in food grain production per capita whereas the ßood variable has no discernible impact. Column (4) shows that ßood damage is positively related on extremely high rainfall and is negatively related to droughts. This increases our faith that the variables that we using to capture the need for public action are both meaningful and contain a signiÞcant exogenous component.
Policy Responses
Turning now to government reactions, we use data on public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure. Reactions to variations in food production and ßood damage are in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) . Column (2) displays a negative association between public food distribution and food grain production. However, public food distribution appears to be unrelated to ßood damage (column (3)). Columns (5) and (6) suggest that calamity relief expenditure responds positively to ßood damage, while being largely independent of food grain production. This gives us two well-deÞned policy response systems on which to base our analysis. Results are thus presented in separate panels in the tables that follow.
Determinants of Government Activism
We next consider the economic, media and political determinants of government activism. The results in Table 3 include state income per capita, urbanization, the log of total population, population density and revenue from the center as proxies for the capacity of governments to respond. We might expect richer states to have more developed response mechanisms. Population density, urbanization and log population should also reßect the ease of reaching target populations. States receiving greater per capita revenue transfers from the center may also be more capable of responding to shocks. Surprisingly we Þnd no impact of state income on either public food distribution or calamity relief expenditures. The same follows for revenue from the center and population density. Column (1) suggests that more urbanized states have higher levels of public food distribution. This effect, however, disappears when we control for media and political variables (columns (2) and (3)). Having a larger population does appear to be correlated with lower per capita public food distribution. In column (4) we observe that none of these factors appear to affect calamity relief expenditures. 21 Overall, these results suggest that economic factors have a limited inßuence on government responsiveness.
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Columns (2) and (5) look at whether newspaper circulation explains responsiveness. They reveal a positive correlation between newspaper circulation levels and our two measures of government responses. 23 The effects are large and signiÞcant -a 1% increase in newspaper circulation is associated with a 2.4% increase in public food distribution and a 5.5% increase in calamity relief expenditures. Moreover, the result is robust to controlling for the political variables introduced in columns (3) and (6) . States with higher levels of media development are thus more active in protecting vulnerable citizens. This is consistent with the theoretical idea that this is due to improvements in political accountability.
We next consider a number of political factors that might encourage politicians to increase their effort in protecting vulnerable citizens. Greater electoral turnout can serve as a proxy for the general level of political activism and hence the likelihood that voters will reward incumbents who perform well. We thus include turnout in state elections lagged one period as an explanatory variable. The theory showed why effort may be enhanced where political competition is more intense and incumbents are less secure. We measure this by the absolute difference between the number of seats held by Congress, the dominant party over the 1958-1992 period, and its main competitor (see Appendix Table) . Finally we consider whether, given that voters may have better memories about recent events, state governments are more active near elections. To look at this we create a dummy for whether it is an election or pre-election year.
Columns (3) and (6) of Table 3 report the speciÞcation that includes these political variables. Turnout in the previous election does not affect responsiveness of state governments. Greater political competition is associated with higher levels of public food distribution. 24 However, this is not the case for calamity relief. Public food distribution, but not calamity relief, is higher during election and pre-election years. (The coefficient corresponds to a 15% increase in public food distribution in election and pre-election years.) Levels of public food distribution respond to political competition and the timing of elections whereas calamity relief does not. This is consistent with public food distribution being a highly visible, and hence politicized, means of dealing with food insecurity (see Radhakrishna and Subbarrao, 1997) .
Overall, the results point to the centrality of mechanisms for improving accountreßect a greater need for this type of spending in less urbanised and less densely populated states. 22 Of course, the Þxed effects may be proxying for long-run economic differences between states. We also Þnd that, controlling for state and year effects, public food distribution and calamity relief are uncorrelated with poverty as measured by the headcount ratio. This suggests that these are policies that equip citizens with some degree of protection against adverse events as opposed to being highly redistributive in nature. This is in line with the widely held view that thought the size of recurrent transfers in the public distribution system are not large enough to inßuence chronic poverty the system has an important role to play in protecting citizens from short term food crises (see Dreze 1991; Radhakrishna and Subbarao, 1997) ability beyond the role of economic development as a means of encouraging government activism. This resonates with recent calls to improve "governance" in low income countries as a means of enhancing the well-being of the poor (see World Bank, 2000).
Newspapers and Responsiveness
We now look at the role of media in greater detail. The basic results are those in columns (1) and (4) of Table 4 . Newspaper circulation now enters both as a level term and interacted with the food production and ßood damage variables which capture the need for state intervention. We maintain the full set of controls from columns (3) and (6) in Table 3 .
The interaction terms are signiÞcant for both policy response systems. Thus, a given fall in food production yields more public action in situations where newspaper circulation is higher. Similarly, a given level of crop damage due to ßoods yields more calamity relief expenditures when newspaper circulation is higher. Thus, higher newspaper circulation is associated with government being more responsive to falls in food production and ßood damage.
To give some idea of the magnitudes involved, a 10% drop in food production is associated with a 1% increase in public food distribution in states which are at the median in terms of newspaper circulation per capita. However, for states that are in the 75% percentile in terms of newspaper circulation per capita we Þnd that a 10% drop in food production is associated with a 2.28% increase in public food distribution.
These results are consistent with the theory -a given shock will be responded to more by an incumbent when media is more highly developed. The interaction terms are also less likely to be due to an omitted "social development" or "social capital" factor that is correlated with newspaper circulation.
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We now consider results where newspaper circulation is disaggregated by language. India is a linguistically diverse country and the large array of languages in which newspapers are published is symptomatic of this. In our data set we have annual circulation broken down into nineteen different languages.
26 Hindi and English are the two languages that have greater national coverage, the others tending to be concentrated in particular states. With growing literacy following Independence there has been a dramatic rise in circulation of newspapers published in these regional 25 To further underline our interpretation of this, we note that food grain production is signiÞ-cantly affected by droughts ( Table 2 , column (1)). We used this fact to look purely at the"shock" component in food grain production by running a regression of food grain production on state and year Þxed effects, and the drought and ßood variables. We then took this predicted value and used it in place of the food grain production variable to explain the level of public food distribution. Interestingly, the level of this variable does not explain public food distribution. However, there is a signiÞcant interaction term between this variable and newspaper circulation. Moreover, the size of the coefficient estimated is very similar to those in the regressions that have food grain production per capita in the interaction terms. We think that this supports our interpretation of the level and interaction terms. The results are available from the authors on request.
26 These are: Assamese, Bengali, English, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Konkani, Malayalam, Marathi, Manipuri, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu and Urdu.
languages (Jeffrey, 2000) . It is more likely that newspapers published in languages that are state speciÞc will report localized events. Readership of regional newspapers will also tend to comprise local vulnerable populations who rely on action by state governments for protection. Taken together these two factors suggest that local language newspapers may play a greater role in making state politicians more responsive to local crises than newspapers published in English in Hindi.
Patterns of the evolution of newspaper readership broken down by language vary considerably by state. For example, the state of Kerala that has had rapid increase in newspaper circulation has mainly done so by increasing circulation of titles in local languages. Overall, circulation of English newspapers has not increased over the period while Hindi newspapers have increased their circulation by 5.8% per annum. However, this varies from a 24% annual growth rate in Assam to a 17% annual reduction in Karnataka. Overall, non-English, non-Hindi newspaper circulation grows at 1.7% with a 7% growth rate in Bihar and small declines in three states. This time series variation combined with differences in the characteristics of newspapers published in scope and audience can be exploited to more robustly identify media effects.
Results in Table 4 permit three categories of newspaper circulation to enter into the analysis. Columns (2) and (5) of Table 4 enter these variables linearly where we Þnd that "other" newspaper circulation drives government activism -neither English or Hindi circulation are associated with higher levels of public distribution or calamity relief at the state level. Columns (3) and (6) permit interaction terms with the food production and ßood damage terms conÞrming the idea that it is "other" newspaper circulation that drives the results. Interaction terms for both Hindi and English newspapers are both insigniÞcant.
These Þndings make sense as we are studying responses by state governments where the role of more localized press would likely be more important. Moreover, it also seems reasonable to suppose, in line with our theory, that, due to language barriers, the vulnerable citizens are less likely to have access to publications in Hindi and English in most states where local languages are the lingua franca. Hence, regional presses, which also have a greater incentive to cover local issues, are at the heart of why media development encourages government responsiveness.
The results are also persuasive as the particular category of newspapers driving the results is much less likely to be driven by a monolithic omitted "social development" variable which is correlated both with government responsiveness and newspaper circulation. It is difficult to identify omitted variables (demand, social development, education) that would be correlated with "other" circulation but not with English or Hindi circulation.
All of this notwithstanding, a concern may remain that what we are Þnding is really not due to newspapers increasing political accountability, but due to some correlation between newspaper circulation and the error. We now consider an instrumental variables approach which tackles this head on. This draws on theory by Besley and Prat (2001) which develops an approach where press freedom is determined endogenously depending on how easily governments can capture the media. They argue that ownership of the media can affect press freedom since it will affect the cost of government suppressing the press. 27 Besley and Prat (2001) Þnd some supporting evidence for this idea in cross-country data.
In an Indian context, we also Þnd that the ownership structure of the media is correlated with newspaper circulation. If media owned by the state or by political parties are more susceptible to political inßuence, then the news that they carry will be regarded as less credible, leading to a lower level of newspaper circulation. We therefore use newspaper ownership as an instrument for newspaper circulation. This will work provided that the forces that shape ownership differences are not a direct determinant of government responsiveness.
To implement this, we collected detailed annual data on who owns newspapers in Indian states for the period 1958-1992.
28 Most newspapers in India are owned by individuals or registered societies and associations. State ownership is uncommon comprising less than 2 % of all titles. In columns (3) and (6) of Table 5 we regress newspaper circulation on different ownership shares as well as political controls, economic controls and state and year effects. State ownership along with an amalgam of minor ownership forms is the omitted category. We observe effects that are consistent with the Besley-Prat (2001) theory -greater ownership by registered societies and associations, a widely held form of private ownership tends to enhance circulation as does individual ownership to a lesser extent. In contrast greater ownership by political parties tends to depress circulation. The F tests in Table 5 indicate that these instruments are jointly signiÞcant indicating that they do a decent job in explaining differences in newspaper circulation. The results in columns (3) and (6) also conÞrm that neither food grain production and nor ßood crop damage drives newspaper circulation. This we are not picking up an effect due to both needs and newspaper circulation both rising together in times of need.
Columns (1) and (4) of Table 5 report results where ownership variables instrument for newspaper circulation. These instruments comfortably pass overidentiÞ-cation tests suggesting that it may be reasonable to suppose that ownership drives circulation without explaining variations in responsiveness. In both columns (1) and (4) we continue to observe that higher newspaper circulation is associated with greater government activism in both public food distribution and calamity relief. Columns (2) and (5) also include the predicted circulation level interacted with the variables which capture the need for state intervention. These show that, for a given fall in food production or level of ßood damage, having greater newspaper circulation is associated with greater government responsiveness. Comparing Tables 4 and 5 it is notable that coefficients on media are actually much larger when we instrument. This is more consistent with an attenuation bias (measurement error) story than an endogeneity story.
Overall, these results suggest a rather persuasive role for newspapers in driving greater government responsiveness in a way that the theory suggests should be the case.
Politics and Responsiveness
We now delve deeper into the role of the political variables in driving responsiveness, by interacting the political variables from Table 3 with the food production and ßood damage variables. The results are in Table 6 .
Columns (1) and (4) suggests that greater electoral turnout is associated with greater responsiveness -as food production falls or as ßood damage increases, having higher turnout in the previous election tends to increase the responsiveness of governments to these events. This is consistent with the idea that electoral threats will tend to be greater where states have a greater tradition of turning out to vote.
Columns (2) and (5) include interactions between our political competition variable (which is deÞned as minus the absolute difference between seats occupied by the ruling party and its main competitor) and the food production and ßood damage variables. We Þnd here that, for a given fall in food production or level of ßood damage, having greater political competition leads to greater public food distribution and calamity relief.
29 Consistent with the theory, greater political competition is associated with increased government responsiveness. Columns (3) and (6) introduce an interaction term for the election and pre-election year effects. These do not appear to inßuence responsiveness.
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Together these results conÞrm the importance of politics to the relief process. Overall, political effects are more pronounced for food distribution than for calamity relief. This is understandable given that the public food distribution system is a larger, more politicized operation. Ration shops which operate during both shock and non-shock periods are viewed as key source of social protection for the poor and vulnerable against both chronic and transitory food insecurity and are a subject of intense political debate and scrutiny. In contrast, calamity relief expenditure being both limited to shock periods and beneÞting a smaller fraction of the electorate are likely to attract relatively less political attention.
Conclusions
An effectively functioning democracy has many facets. Among them is the possibility of creating incentives for elected officials to respond to citizens' needs. In this paper we have argued that mass media and open political institutions can affect government activisn and responsiveness. This contrasts which economic development which appears to be relatively unimportant. Elections provide an incentive for politicians to perform which can be enhanced by development of the media. Through this mechanism we would expect responsiveness of the government to salient issues such as crisis management to be greater where the media is more developed.
India is a key place to test these ideas -combining an active press with a large vulnerable population which is regularly buffeted by natural shocks. Moreover, the sheer size of the Indian population make the welfare consequences public action or inaction of high order.
Our results relate to an earlier literature which examines the importance of the media in famine relief policy (see Ram, 1991) . Perhaps the most famous pronouncement on this subject was in Amartya Sen's 1981 Coromandel lecture published as Sen (1984) . He observes that: "India has not had a famine since independence, and given the nature of Indian politics and society, it is not likely that India can have a famine even in years of great food problems. The government cannot afford to fail to take prompt action when large-scale starvation threatens. Newspapers play an important part in this, in making the facts known and forcing the challenge to be faced." page 84.
Our results are consistent with this assessment. However, they highlight how a number of other factors, including turnout, political competition and the timing of elections affect how governments respond. In addition, the results highlight the importance of local language newspapers in transmitting information. Thus representative democracy and the development of free and independent regional presses appear as key factors in ensuring protection for vulnerable citizens.
The empirical results can be accounted for by a simple theoretical model where governments maximize their re-election chances. The role of the media enhances their incentives to do so by more closely tying their actions to voting outcomes.
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Moreover, a number of other implications of the model are corroborated in the data.
There is scope for further work that tries to link government policy to media development, especially in developing countries. In an Indian context, there may be other policies that respond to media development. Our results also underline the potential role of civil society, media being a key branch, to an effectively functioning democracy. The formal institutions of political competition (such as open elections) are not sufficient to deliver a responsive government unless voters have the real authority to discipline poorly functioning incumbents.
Data Appendix
The data used in the paper come from a wide variety of sources.
32 They cover the sixteen main Indian states listed in Table 1 Flood Damage is from state-wise data on the value of crops affected by ßoods measured in rupees from the Central Water Commission, Government of India. This is expressed in real per capita terms. Public food distribution is food grains measured in tonnes distributed via the Public Food Distribution system and comes from the Bulletin on Food Statistics, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of India. This is expressed in per capita terms. Calamity relief expenditure comes from the social expenditure series in state expenditure accounts is published on an annual basis in the Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, Reserve Bank of India, Bombay, India. This is expressed in real per capita terms. Drought and flood are dummy variables for when annual average rainfall is two standard deviations below or above or below the state speciÞc rainfall mean 1958-1992. Rainfall data are from the Statistical Abstract of India, Government of India. Newspaper circulation is the average number of copies of newspapers/periodicals sold or distributed free per publishing day and from Press in India, Annual Report of the Registrar of Newspapers for India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. This information is also available from the same source bro-ken down by language and we have constructed three groupings: English, Hindi and "other" which includes newspapers/periodicals published in Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Kannada, Kashmiri, Konkani, Malayalam, Marathi, Manipuri, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu and Urdu. From the same source we also have data on ownership of newspapers. Newspapers are classiÞed as belonging to one of twelve ownership types (central government, state government, individual, public joint stock company, private joint stock company, Þrm or partnership, trust, society or association, educational institution, international organization, political party or foreign mission). Individual and society or association are the dominant forms of ownership accounting for 84 % of newspaper titles in India. Newspaper ownership is expressed as a share of total newspaper titles. Turnout is turnout in state elections, which take place on average every four years, from Butler, Lahiri and Roy (1991) India Decides : Elections 1952-1991. (New Delhi : Aroom Purie for Living Media, India). This variable is held constant between elections. The regressions use turnout lagged one period. Political competition is deÞned as minus the absolute difference between the proportion of seats occupied by the Congress party (which has the been the dominant party over the period) and the proportion occupied by its main competitor(s). A larger value thus indicates greater political competition. The Appendix Table gives the party cleavages used. The Congress Party has been the dominant political force over the period. The main political threat over the period has come from the Janata grouping of parties. In six states, Andra Pradesh, Assam, Jammu & Kashmir, Orissa, Punjab and Tamil Nadu, Congress has also been competing with state-speciÞc Regional parties. In three states, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, Congress is in competition with the Bharatiya Janata Party which has a non-secular Hindu orientation and has been growing in importance over time. In two states, Kerala and West Bengal, Congress has been competing for political power over the period with Hard Left parties. The data on seats held by different political parties is from Butler, Lahiri and Roy (1991) India Decides : Elections 1952-1991. (New Delhi : Aroom Purie for Living Media, India). Election dummy is a variable that is equal to one in years in which there is a state legislative election and the year before. This is from Butler, Lahiri and Roy (1991) India Decides : Elections 1952-1991. (New Delhi : Aroom Purie for Living Media, India). State income comes from Estimates of State Domestic Product published by Department of Statistics, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of India. This is deßated and expressed in per capita terms. The regressions use the logged value of real state income per capita. Ratio of urban to total population is a measure of how urbanized a state is and is constructed using data which is interpolated between the 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991 censuses (Census of India, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Government of India) Population density takes interpolated total population data from the Census and divides this by total land area of each state using data from Census Atlas of India, Registrar General & Census Commissioner, Office of the Registrar General, Government of India. Log population is the log of total population. Revenue from centre is the share of state revenue obtained from the centre. This revenue comes from three central taxes: (i) union excises, (ii) corporate and individual income taxes and (iii) estate taxes -the former two being the major taxes which are shared with the states. Together revenue from these taxes accounts for 33 % of state total taxes in the states across the 1958-1992 period. The source of this data is Public Finance Statistics (Ministry of Finance, Government of India). This information is also collated in the Reserve Bank of India's annual publication Report on Currency and Finance.
Food Grain Production Per Capita We therefore have a total of 552 possible observations. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data. Public food distribution, food grain production and newspaper circulation are expressed in per capita terms. Calamity relief expenditure and flood damage are in real per capita terms. "Other" captures circulation of newspapers published in languages other than English or Hindi. The political controls are turnout lagged one period, minus the absolute difference in the share of seats occupied by the dominant political party and its main competitor and a dummy for whether it is an election or pre-election year. The economic controls are log real state income per capita, ratio of urban to total population, population density, log of total population and revenue received from the centre expressed in real per capita terms. We therefore have a total of 552 possible observations. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data. Public food distribution, food grain production and newspaper circulation are expressed in per capita terms. Calamity relief expenditure and flood damage are in real per capita terms. "Other" captures circulation of newspapers published in languages other than English or Hindi. Ownership share refer to the numbers of titles under different forms of ownership expressed as share of total titles. Columns (3) and (6) present regressions used for instrumenting newspaper circulation in columns (1), (2); and (4), (5) respectively. The overidentification test we employ is due to Sargan (1958) . The number of observations times the R-squared from the regression of the stage two residuals on the instruments is distributed χ 2 (T +1) where T is the number of instruments. The political controls are turnout lagged one period, minus the absolute difference in the share of seats occupied by the dominant political party and its main competitor and a dummy for whether it is an election or pre-election year. The economic controls are log real state income per capita, ratio of urban to total population, population density, log of total population and revenue received from the centre expressed in real per capita terms. We therefore have a total of 552 possible observations. Deviations from this are accounted for by missing data. Public food distribution and food grain production are expressed in per capita terms. Calamity relief expenditure and flood damage are in real per capita terms. Turnout is lagged one period and thus refers to turnout in the previous election. Political competition is defined as minus the absolute value of the absolute difference in the share of seats occupied by the dominant political party and its main competitor. Election dummy is a dummy for whether it is an election or pre-election year. The economic controls are log real state income per capita, ratio of urban to total population, population density, log of total population and revenue received from the centre expressed in real per capita terms.
